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This paper presents new empirical evidence on intertemporal labor supply elasticities. We 
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from mandated discontinuous changes in retirement benefits from the Austrian pension 
system. We first present graphical evidence documenting delays in retirement in response to 
the policy discontinuities. Next, based on the empirical evidence, we develop a model of 
career length decisions. Using an estimator that exploits the graphical evidence, we estimate 
an intertemporal labor supply elasticity of 0.30; this relatively low estimate reflects that the 
disutility of labor supply rises relatively quickly with additional years of work. 
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The theory of intertemporal labor supply is the workhorse theory of dynamic labor
supply decisions in economics. In numerous applications of this theory in macroeconomics,
labor economics and public economics, the intertemporal labor supply elasticity plays a
central role in understanding business cycle ￿ uctuations, lifetime devoted to market work,
and responses to income tax and transfer programs. Despite its importance in macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic models, there is a wide-spread debate regarding the magnitude
of the intertemporal labor supply elasticity, with higher and lower elasticities having vastly
di⁄erent policy implications.
In this study, we provide new empirical evidence on intertemporal labor supply elastic-
ities in a life-cycle setting using responses to policy discontinuities in retirement bene￿ts in
Austria. We ￿rst present nonparametric graphical evidence documenting individuals￿labor
supply responses to the policy discontinuities. Next, we develop a strategy to estimate the
intertemporal labor supply elasticity. The strategy exploits the observed labor supply re-
sponses. Based on the observed patterns in individuals￿retirement decisions, we estimate
an intertemporal labor supply elasticity of 0:30; this estimate re￿ ects that the disutility of
labor supply increases relatively quickly with more years of work.
There has been signi￿cant research on intertemporal labor supply elasticities yielding a
wide range of values. Speci￿cally, macroeconomic models explaining aggregate labor supply
responses assume relatively high elasticities, while estimates based on micro data typically
￿nd small labor supply elasticities.1 Recent e⁄orts to reconcile higher and lower elasticities
have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the intensive and extensive
margins in labor supply decisions.2 Intuitively, small labor supply responses on the intensive
margin re￿ ecting hours of work decisions may well be compatible with large responses at
the extensive margin re￿ ecting career length or participation decisions. As most previous
studies examining individual-level labor supply have focused on intensive margin decisions,
the responsiveness in labor supply along the extensive margin in micro data has been
identi￿ed as a key issue.3 In this study, we are able to estimate an intertemporal labor
1For microeconomic evidence on intertemporal substitution in labor supply, see MaCurdy (1981), Brown-
ing, Deaton and Irish (1985), Altonji (1986), Card (1994) and the survey discussions in Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) and Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). For macroeconomic evidence, see Mulligan
(1999), Ljungqvist et al (2006), Ohanian et al (2008), Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2010) and the survey discussions in Prescott (2006) and Keane and Rogerson (2010).
2Other e⁄orts to reconcile higher and lower elasticities have focused on human capital (see Imai and
Keane (2009)) and adjustment costs (see Chetty (2009)).
3Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), Heckman (1993), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Browning,
2supply elasticity while focusing explicitly on an extensive margin decision. In particular, we
estimate the extensive margin Frisch elasticity, or more intuitively, the elasticity of career
length with respect to anticipated wages.
The policy discontinuities exploited in this study arise because a lump-sum component
of retirement bene￿ts in Austria increases discontinuously once individuals complete speci￿c
threshold amounts of tenure prior to their retirements. These bene￿ts are fully anticipated
by the workers and thus incorporated into lifetime wealth. This allows us to focus on
marginal-utility-of-wealth-constant labor supply responses. While the lump-sum bene￿ts
increase discontinuously by a considerable amount (about 30% of an annual salary), they
are small relative to lifetime income. We therefore assume that income e⁄ects from the
discontinuous bene￿t increases are negligible so that the labor supply responses to the
severance payments are only delays in individuals￿retirement decisions.
We examine behavior before and after multiple tenure thresholds to determine if individ-
uals extend their careers in response to the anticipated discontinuous increases in bene￿ts.
Graphical evidence based on a large sample of individual retirements from administrative
records indicates reduced numbers of retirements just prior to the thresholds and excess
numbers of retirements just after the thresholds. The empirical analysis provides clear evi-
dence on the nature of labor supply decisions in the face of retirement bene￿ts. Speci￿cally,
we can identify how long individuals are willing to delay retirement to become eligible for
bene￿ts. Further, heterogeneity analysis allows us to distinguish between individuals who
are able to respond to the bene￿t incentive and others who are constrained by health or
job related problems.
Motivated by the empirical analysis, we build a labor supply model that generates the
retirement patterns observed in the data. In particular, the model captures the reduced
retirements prior to the tenure thresholds and the excess retirements just after the tenure
thresholds. We then develop a strategy to estimate the extensive margin intertemporal
labor supply elasticity based on relating the observed retirement patterns to the model￿ s
predicted patterns. More speci￿cally, the estimation strategy is based on matching the ob-
served maximum length of time that individuals delay their retirements in response to the
severance payments to the model￿ s corresponding predicted maximum delay time. While
this estimator relies on discontinuities in individuals￿budget constraints, it is similar in
spirit to previous bunching estimators that exploit kinks in individuals￿budget constraints
Hansen, and Heckman (1999) also have emphasized the distinction between the intensive and extensive
margins in labor supply decisions.
3(see Saez (1999, 2009) and Chetty et al (2010)). Furthermore, we highlight that the esti-
mation strategy exploits exogenous variation in individuals￿budget sets coming from the
policy discontinuities and allows for estimation of a policy-relevant structural parameter
without requiring ad hoc distributional assumptions.4
Overall, the empirical analysis yields the following results. The graphical analysis in-
dicates that individuals do not delay their retirements by much time in response to the
severance payments. We estimate a maximum delay time of 1:25 years, and this drives a
relatively low estimate for the intertemporal labor supply elasticity of 0:30. These results
highlight that the disutility of labor supply rises relatively quickly with additional years of
work. Thus, it is di¢ cult to reconcile larger macro intertemporal labor supply elasticities
with smaller microeconomic estimates based solely on the di⁄erences between intensive and
extensive margin labor supply decisions. Larger macro elasticities may be driven by other
factors such as adjustment costs or search frictions (see Chetty et al (2010) and Hall (2006)
respectively).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses both the institutional background
regarding the Austrian pension system and the administrative data from the Austrian
Social Security Database. Section 3 presents a nonparametric graphical analysis of the
data. Section 4 develops an intertemporal labor supply model based on the empirical
evidence presented in section 3. Section 5 develops the elasticity estimation strategy and
then presents the estimation results and sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background & Data
2.1 Retirement Bene￿ts in Austria
There are two forms of government-mandated retirement bene￿ts in Austria: (1) government-
provided pension bene￿ts and (2) employer-provided severance payments. We start with
the description of severance payments since these payments are the primary focus of the
current study. The employer-provided severance payments are made to private sector em-
ployees who have accumulated su¢ cient years of tenure by the time of their retirement.
Tenure is de￿ned as uninterrupted employment time with a given employer and retirement
is based on claiming a government-provided pension. The payments must be made within
4It is possible to estimate alternative dynamic structural models, though we lack data on individuals￿
consumption and savings decisions. We leave these considerations for future work.
44 weeks of claiming a pension according to the following schedule. If an employee has
accumulated at least 10 years of tenure with her employer by the time of retirement, the
employer must pay one third of the worker￿ s last year￿ s salary. This fraction increases from
one third to one half, three quarters and one at 15, 20 and 25 years of tenure respectively.
This schedule for the severance payments is illustrated in Figure 1. The payments are
made in lump-sum and, since payments are based on an employee￿ s salary, overtime com-
pensation and other non-salary payments are not included when determining the amounts
of the payments. Provisions to make these payments come from funds that employers are
mandated to hold based on the total number of employees. Severance payments are also
made to individuals who are involuntarily separated (i.e. laid o⁄) from their ￿rms if the
individuals have accumulated su¢ cient years of tenure prior to the separation. The only
voluntary separation that leads to a severance payment, however, is retirement. Employ-
ment protection rules hinder ￿rms from strategically laying o⁄ workers to avoid severance
payments and there is no evidence on an increased frequency of layo⁄s before the severance
pay thresholds.5 In general, older workers approaching retirement age enjoy the highest
level of job protection in Austria.
The Austrian income tax system, which is based on individual taxation, applies par-
ticular rules to tax income from severance payments. Speci￿cally, all mandated severance
payments are exempt from social security contributions and subject to a tax rate of 6%.
The income taxation of the severance payments di⁄ers from the general income tax rules.
Generally, gross monthly earnings net of social security contributions 6 are subject to the
income tax with marginal tax rates in the di⁄erent tax brackets of 0%, 21%, 31% 41% and
50%.7 8
Because the timing of the severance payments relates to pension claiming, eligibility
for government-provided retirement pensions interacts with the severance payment system.
Austria has a public pension system that automatically enrolls every person employed in
the private sector. Fixed pension contributions are withheld from each individual￿ s wage
5For more details regarding the severance payments at times of unemployment, see Card, Chetty and
Weber (2007).
6Contributions for pension, health, unemployment, and accident insurance of 39% are split in half
between employer and employee and the employee￿ s share is withheld from gross annual earnings up to a
contribution cap.
7These tax brackets are based on legislation in 2002; there have subsequently been relatively small
changes due to several small tax reforms.
8Additionally, Austrian employees are typically paid 13th and 14th monthly wage payments in June
and December. These payments, up to an amount of one sixth of annual wage income, are also subject to
a 6% tax rate; amounts in excess of one sixth of annual income are subject to the regular income tax rates.
5and annuitized bene￿ts during retirement are then based on prior contributions (earnings
histories). Replacement rates from the annual payments are roughly 75% of pre-retirement
earnings and there are no actuarial adjustments for delaying retirement to a later age.
Individuals can retire by claiming Disability pensions, Early Retirement pensions and Old
Age pensions. Eligibility for each of these pensions depends on an individual￿ s age and
gender, as well as having a su¢ cient number of contribution years. Beginning at age 55,
private sector male and female employees can retire by claiming Disability pensions, where
disability is based on reduced working capacity of 50% relative to someone of a similar
educational background. At age 55, women also become eligible to claim Early Retirement
pensions, but the Early Retirement Age is age 60 for men. Lastly, men and women become
eligible for Old Age pensions at age 65 and 60 respectively.9 Figure 2 illustrates survival
functions for entry into the pension system for the sample of private sector employees. The
graphs are presented separately for men and women given the di⁄erent eligibility ages.
The survival functions illustrate sharp declines at ages 60 and 65 highlighting a signi￿cant
amount of entry into the pension system once individuals become eligible for the Early
Retirement and Old Age pensions. Additionally, the ￿gure demonstrates that, for both
men and women, most retirements occur between ages 55 and 60. Further, the graph
shows that roughly 25% of the male sample retire by claiming disability pensions prior to
age 60.
2.2 Administrative Data & Sample Restrictions
Our empirical analysis is based on administrative registers from the Austrian Social Se-
curity Database (ASSD, see Zweim￿ller et al (2009)), which is collected with the principle
aim of verifying individual pension claims. The data provide longitudinal information for
the universe of private sector workers in Austria throughout their working lives. Speci￿-
cally, information on employment and earnings as well as other labor market states relevant
for computing insurance years such as military service, unemployment, and maternity leave
is collected. Detailed electronic records with employer identi￿ers that allow the measure-
ment of tenure are recorded in the period from 1972 onwards; here we use information
up to 2006. For the years prior to 1972 retrospective information on insurance relevant
states is available for all individuals who have retired by the end of the observation period.
9Bene￿ts from disability and early retirement are entirely withdrawn if an individual earns more than
about 300 Euros per month; therefore we see very few individuals returning to the labor force once they
are retired.
6Combining the administrative data from 1972 onwards and the retrospective data prior to
1972 yields information on complete earnings and employment careers of retirees. Because
￿rm identi￿ers are available only from 1972 onwards, uncensored tenure can be measured
for jobs starting after January 1, 1972.
To investigate the e⁄ect of severance pay eligibility on retirement decisions we consider
all individuals born between 1930 and 1945. For these individuals we observe su¢ ciently
long uncensored tenure at retirement.10 We focus on workers who are still employed after
their 55th birthday and follow them until entry into retirement or up to the age of 70.
We make several restrictions to the original sample of about 650,000 workers, which are
summarized in the top panel of Table 1. Most importantly, we exclude individuals who
worked as civil servants or whose last job was in construction, because they are subject
to di⁄erent pension and severance pay rules. As we are interested in tenure at retirement,
we further exclude workers with left censored tenure at retirement and we only consider
retirement entries which occur within 6 months of the worker￿ s last job. Individuals with
longer gaps between employment and retirement are only followed until the end of the last
employment. With these restrictions, we have a ￿nal sample of 269;411 retiring individuals.
Table 2 presents summary statistics separately for the full retirement sample and for
the sub-sample of individuals with more than 10 years of tenure at retirement, who are
eligible for severance pay. The median retirement age is at 59 years in both groups, which
re￿ ects that most individuals retire through disability or early retirement (28% and 38%
in the full sample, respectively).11 Years of employment and annual earnings in the last
year before retirement are slightly higher for workers with longer tenure and these workers
also appear to be of better health given their average time spent in sick leave. Overall
the di⁄erences between both groups are minor. Earnings relevant for the calculation of
retirement bene￿ts and therefore recorded by the ASSD are top coded; roughly 14% of the
sample has censored earnings at retirement.
10In addition, these individuals retire after a pension reform in 1985 which changed the assessment basis
for bene￿t calculation and the thereby the type of information recorded.
11The actual share of retirements through early retirement is higher than the presented number, as
separate insurance categories for early retirement are only recorded as of 07/1993 and individuals retiring
before the statutory pension age before that are coded as old age pension entries.
73 Nonparametric Graphical Analysis
In this section we present graphical evidence on the individual labor supply responses
to the severance payment thresholds at retirement. We start with a discussion of patterns
in the distribution of tenure at retirement that are observed in the raw data. In particular,
the observed patterns highlight that individuals delay their retirements in response to the
severance payment thresholds. As we discuss in the estimation strategy below, a key
element for the elasticity estimation is detecting the point at which the delays begin to
occur because the maximum delay time will drive the elasticity estimation. The graphical
evidence in this section indicates that the maximum delay times are relatively short since
delays can only be detected amongst individuals who are relatively close to the thresholds.
To con￿rm that the observed patterns correspond to reactions to the severance payment
rule, we present three pieces of additional empirical evidence in this section. First, we
investigate the variation of other observables around the tenure thresholds and examine
whether or not this variation in other observables can explain the observed patterns in the
distribution of tenure at retirement. Second, we examine whether decisions earlier in life
such as job changes at particular ages are responsible for the retirement patterns. Finally,
we investigate how the patterns in tenure at retirement vary across various subgroups
within the sample. We con￿rm that there is heterogeneity in the retirement patterns such
that there are less (more) distinctive patterns amongst groups that we expect to be less
(more) responsive to the severance payments. While this section focuses on highlighting the
empirical evidence on labor supply responses to the severance payments, the next section
presents a model of retirement decisions motivated by the empirical evidence.
3.1 Distribution of Tenure at Retirement
Figure 3 presents the distribution of tenure at retirement for the full sample with the
number of individuals on the vertical axis and years of tenure at retirement on the hor-
izontal axis; tenure at retirement is measured at a monthly frequency. Several features
are immediately evident from this graph. First, the plot shows discontinuous spikes in the
number of retirements at the tenure thresholds. Second, there are dips in the number of
retirements just before the tenure thresholds, which are generally concentrated within 1
year before the threshold. These patterns are regularly repeated at each tenure threshold
but are not apparent at any other point in the tenure distribution. This evidence suggests
that individuals who would have retired just before the thresholds in the absence of the
8severance pay discontinuities end up delaying their retirements until they just qualify for
the (larger) severance payments. The plot also indicates a seasonal pattern illustrated by
small spikes in the number of retirement at each integer value of years of tenure at re-
tirement. The seasonality can be explained by a relatively large fraction of job starts in
January and corresponding retirement exits in December.
Some noteworthy features are indicated by the pattern in Figure 3. First, the dips and
spikes around the tenure thresholds are clearly separated from each other. This suggests
that labor supply responses to each tenure threshold occur in a relatively narrow time
window around the threshold. An impact of the severance pay schedule on intertemporal
labor supply decisions beyond a ￿ve-year horizon is therefore not supported by the data.
Second, we do not detect any evidence for income e⁄ects based on the observed patterns.
In the presence of detectable income e⁄ects, individuals who qualify for the severance
payments would end up retiring earlier than they would have in the absence of the severance
payments; the observed patterns, however, seem to indicate that the only responses to
the severance payments are delays in retirement decisions. Third, even though there are
decreases prior to the thresholds, the frequency of retirements never goes to zero just prior
to the thresholds. This means there appears to be a substantial number of individuals who
are unresponsive to the severance pay system at retirement. Our analysis of heterogeneity
in labor supply responses will concentrate on identifying the unresponsive groups; we will
examine how health, earnings, ￿rm size and job rigidity relate to responsiveness to the
severance pay thresholds.
3.2 Accounting for Covariates
We exploit panel variation in the probability of retirement to examine whether or not
other observable characteristics change around the tenure thresholds. In particular, we




￿￿d￿ + Xit￿ + ￿it
where rit is an indicator equal to 1 if individual i retires within time period t. The set of
observations per individual covers all quarters from age 55 to retirement or age 70. The
sample used for estimation includes all 380,737 individuals left at the last step of sample
selection in Table 1, not only those observed retiring within 6 month of their last job.
9Including all job exits allows us to examine whether or not regularities in general job exits
(as opposed to just retirements) after 5, 10, 15, ... year intervals are responsible for the
observed retirement patterns in Figure 3. For computational reasons, time is measured at
a quarterly frequency instead of the monthly frequency presented in Figure 3.
The regressors in the estimated equation are a set of indicators d￿ equal to 1 if the
individual￿ s quarterly tenure at time t equals ￿. Further, we include a large set of time-
varying control variables Xit relating to age, calendar years, industry, region, seasonality,
earnings histories, ￿rm characteristics, health and experience.12
Figure 4 plots the coe¢ cients on the quarterly tenure dummies from the estimated
regressions. The graph shows a pattern of dips before and large spikes at the thresholds
that is very similar to Figure 3. The yearly seasonality pattern is now removed by controls
for quarter of the year. Overall, Figure 4 con￿rms that incentives in the severance pay
system are driving the retirement pattern around the tenure thresholds rather than other
observable characteristics or regularities in job-leaving behavior.
3.3 Job Starts
After highlighting individuals￿responsiveness to the severance payments at retirement
in the ￿gures above, we now turn to the question whether these payments a⁄ect individu-
als￿decisions to begin new jobs. Speci￿cally, we investigate whether individuals time the
beginning of new jobs so that they can retire at the Early Retirement Ages (ERAs, respec-
tively 55 and 60 for women and men) and also claim severance payments at the time of
their retirements. To explore this idea, Figure 5 plots the number of individuals starting
new jobs (vertical axis) against age measured at a quarterly frequency (horizontal axis).
If individuals are timing the beginning of their new jobs so that they can just complete
10, 15, or 20 years of tenure at the ERAs, then we would expect to see sharp increases in
the number of individuals starting new jobs at ages 50, 45, 40 etc. The evidence in Figure
5 shows no discernible change in job starts at any age prior to the ERAs. This smooth-
ness across age emphasizes that, while there is evidence that some individuals delay their
12Firm size is grouped into the following categories: ￿ 5, 6￿10;11￿25;26￿99;100￿499;500￿999;￿ 1000.
Health status through age 54 is based on the following categories of sick leave through age 54: ￿ 0:5 years,
0:5￿1 years, 1￿2 years, and ￿ 2 years. Health in the current quarter is based on the following categories
for sick leave in the current quarter: 0 days, 1 ￿ 30 days, 31 ￿ 60 days, and ￿ 61 days. Earnings growth
dummies are based on positive, negative, or zero growth relative to earnings in the corresponding quarter.
Quarterly earnings for individuals with continuous employment during a calendar year are equal to total
annual earnings divided by 4. Earnings for individuals retiring at the beginning of a quarter are set equal
to earnings from the previous quarter. For women, the base controls also include a dummy for having kids.
10retirements to qualify for (larger) severance payments at retirement, there is no evidence
that individuals reallocate their labor supply (or participation) at earlier ages in response
to the sizeable anticipated incentives from the severance payments.
3.4 Heterogeneity
Above we have seen that, while there is a clear pattern in the frequencies of retirement
around the tenure threshold, there are also retirements occurring in the months directly
before a tenure threshold. This means that a substantial fraction of the sample seems to be
unresponsive to the incentives created by the severance system. Here we examine di⁄erences
in responsiveness along observable individual and job characteristics. In particular, we
consider heterogeneity by health status, position in the earnings distribution, ￿rm size,
and job rigidity.
We start by investigating heterogeneity related to health status. We measure ill health
based on the fraction of time between age 54 and retirement spent on sick leave.13 We de￿ne
an individual as unhealthy if the fraction of time between age 54 and retirement spent on
sick leave is above the median fraction of time for individuals with positive sick leave days.
Figure 6 presents frequency plots for unhealthy and healthy individuals, respectively. As
expected, unhealthy individuals are not very ￿ exible in the timing of their retirements. We
basically see no response to the thresholds among retirees with health problems. Thus,
some of the pre-threshold retirement is likely to be driven by negative health shocks and
also more permanently poor health status.
Next we turn to heterogeneity related to earnings. We group individuals by the cal-
ender year when they turn 55 and by tenure at the end of age 54; within each group, we
compute percentiles of the distribution of average real earnings between ages 50 through
54. We condition on tenure at the end of age 54 because we want to account for returns
to tenure and compare higher and lower earnings individuals with similar tenure levels at
retirement. Figure 7 presents the distributions of tenure at retirement for di⁄erent earn-
ings percentiles. Because of the relatively small sample sizes, this graph shows frequencies
for pooled observations in the two years before and after each of the tenure thresholds.
The plots illustrate less pooling amongst individuals at higher earnings percentiles. These
13Roughly 35% of individuals in our sample have no sick leave days over their entire careers and 68%
have no sick leave between ages 54 and retirement. Health status is highly correlated with the likelihood of
claiming disability pension; about 64% of individuals with some sick leave between age 54 and retirement
claim disability pensions as opposed to 15% of those with no sick leave between age 54 and retirement.
11high-earning individuals are most likely a⁄ected by the social security earnings cap and
therefore have other savings and private pensions. This makes changes in their budget sets
due to the severance payments relatively small.
Job and employer characteristics are also likely to in￿ uence a worker￿ s ￿ exibility in
timing his retirement date. Therefore we next examine retirement patterns by ￿rm size.
Intuitively, individuals employed in smaller ￿rms may be more restricted in choosing their
retirement dates around the tenure thresholds. Small employers may put more pressure on
their employees to retire prior to qualifying for a (larger) severance payment. Additionally,
employees at smaller ￿rms may have less ability to leave their ￿rms just after reaching a
tenure threshold since their employers may rely on them to complete their projects since
there are fewer substitutable employees available to do so. The evidence presented in Figure
8 is consistent with these intuitions as the plots indicate that the pre-threshold dips and
post-threshold spikes increase monotonically with ￿rm size.
As ￿rm size plays a considerable role for individual retirement decisions, we examine
also other rigidities that may be imposed by an individual￿ s job situation. In particular, we
use ￿rm level information on job exits and retirements to infer the restrictions an individual
may face in the choice of their retirement date. To summarize di⁄erent impacts we create a
job rigidity index based on three components. First, we measure the rate of exits from the
￿rm in the year of retirement by the number of job spells with the employer ending during
the year divided by the number of employees at the beginning of the year. We then rank
jobs according to the ￿rm level exit rates and de￿ne high exit rate jobs as the top decile.
Second, the Austrian labor market is highly seasonal and we observe that many ￿rms hire
and let go workers only in certain months of the year. This seasonal demand pattern may
also restrict the choice of retirement dates. Therefore we exploit the distribution of exits
from the ￿rm over the calender year and compute the level of exit concentration by the
share of all exits that occur the calendar month with the highest exit rate. Jobs in the
top decile of the exit concentration distribution are de￿ned as jobs in ￿rms with highly
concentrated exits. Third, we investigate retirement behavior of coworkers at the ￿rm
around the tenure thresholds. Speci￿cally, from all retirements at the ￿rm in the past 5
years, we compute the share of retirements that occurred at a tenure level in the year after
a threshold. The bottom decile of jobs in ￿rms with the lowest shares of post-threshold
retirements are de￿ned as jobs in low post-threshold retirement ￿rms. The rigidity index
takes the values from 0 to 2 if the job hits none, one, or at least two of the three rigidity
components (job in ￿rm with high exit rate, with highly concentrated exits, or in ￿rm with
12low level of post-threshold retirements). Figure 9 clearly shows that responsiveness to the
severance pay thresholds decreases as the level of job rigidity increases.
3.5 Restricted Sample
Figures 7 through 9 demonstrate that there are considerable di⁄erences in responsive-
ness to the severance pay thresholds across the population. In principle, there are two
ways to interpret these heterogeneous responses shown in the graphs. First, they could
be the result of heterogeneous preferences and thus heterogeneity in labor supply elastic-
ities throughout the population. Second, the di⁄erence in responsiveness could be due
to constraints and adjustment costs. Following the second interpretation, we assume ho-
mogeneous preferences so that di⁄erences in constraints lead to di⁄erent responses to the
incentives. The reasoning behind this assumption is as follows. The nonresponsive groups
identi￿ed in the graphical analysis have patterns that are mostly smooth through the tenure
thresholds rather than having smaller pre-threshold dips and post-threshold spikes. In ad-
dition, heterogeneity in the graphs occurs along dimensions that could constitute obstacles
to responsiveness such as ill health and job rigidities. We do not detect heterogeneity
along more neutral characteristics such as gender, birth cohorts, skill types, or number
of kids (not shown here). Our interpretation of the heterogeneity patterns thus follows
Chetty (2009) who considers ￿xed costs of adjusting labor supply and their implications
for estimating labor supply elasticities.
We base the main empirical analysis on a restricted sample excluding the most con-
strained groups of individuals. The bottom panel in Table 1 summarizes the decreases in
sample size resulting from excluding the least responsive individuals along each dimension
of heterogeneity that we have examined. The total number of individuals in the restricted
sample is 154;484 individuals. Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of retirements by dis-
tance to the nearest threshold after pooling across all thresholds; this ￿gure is based on
76;400 individuals in the restricted sample with at least 7 years of tenure at retirement.
The basic patterns are the same as for the full sample. Even in the restricted sample, we
still observe several individuals retiring just prior to the severance pay thresholds. However,
eliminating the unresponsive groups does reduce the probability of retirement shortly be-
fore the thresholds. In the full sample, the probability of retiring in a quarter within 1 year
before a threshold is 22% lower than the probability of retiring in any other quarter. Each
sample cut further lowers this probability so that in the restricted sample, the probability
13of retiring in a quarter within 1 year before a threshold is 29% lower than the probability
of retiring in any other quarter.14
4 Theoretical Background
4.1 Preliminaries
We use the empirical evidence from the previous section to guide us in modelling labor
supply responses to the severance payments. The empirical evidence is summarized as
follows. First, the empirical evidence indicates that individuals do not time their job starts
earlier in their careers to be eligible for severance pay at the minimum retirement ages
mandated by the government pension system. Therefore, we focus only on the e⁄ects of
the severance payments on retirement decisions. Second, we will abstract from income
e⁄ects in our theoretical model. Intuitively, the severance payments are small relative
to lifetime income, and individuals may be unlikely to respond to such small changes in
lifetime income. In addition, we ￿nd no clear evidence for income e⁄ects in the retirement
patterns. The absence of income e⁄ects implies that the only e⁄ect severance pay thresholds
can have on retirement decisions in our model is to provide incentives to delay retirement
relative to a counterfactual date without severance pay. Third, given the lack of long-term
planning in relation to the severance payments and the relatively short time-space over
which retirements take place in Austria, the empirical evidence suggests that individuals￿
retirement decisions take into account at most one tenure threshold when deciding when to
retire. We therefore model the decision to delay retirement based on the nearest, upcoming
tenure threshold. Lastly, the empirical evidence from the previous section indicates that
controlling for age and other observable covariates does not alter the observed retirement
patterns. Therefore, we assume that the age or date until which each individual would need
to work to reach the next severance pay threshold is varying exogenously across individuals.
The empirical evidence suggests a basic decision process for retirement decisions and
responses to the ￿nancial incentives from the severance payments. First, individuals ig-
nore the severance payments and select an optimal retirement age while taking all other
￿nancial incentives for retirement into account. We refer to these retirement ages as coun-
terfactual retirement ages. Second, individuals examine the age at which they would reach
14Results from linear probability models of the retirement indicator by quarter on a pre-threshold dummy
and basic controls for gender, age, season, and a set of threshold indicators for di⁄erent subsamples are
available on request.
14their (next) tenure thresholds to qualify for (larger) severance payments. In particular,
individuals compute their delay time based on the di⁄erence between their threshold ages
and their counterfactual retirement ages. Finally, individuals compare their delay times
against a critical value capturing the maximum amount of time they are willing to delay
their retirements. This comparison determines individuals￿ultimate retirement ages; if
their delay time is less than the critical value, then they will retire at their threshold ages,
otherwise they will retire at their counterfactual ages.
We specify the formal optimization problems behind this decision process in the next
subsection. We highlight that the critical value is determined based on an indi⁄erence
condition that expresses indi⁄erence between retiring at an early date without severance
pay and retiring at a threshold with severance pay. The estimation strategy that we
discuss in the next section focuses on this indi⁄erence condition to estimate the structural
parameter of interest, the intertemporal labor supply elasticity.
4.2 Model
In this subsection, we formalize the economic model of individuals￿retirement decisions
that we discussed in the previous subsection. We consider a population of workers who
are employed at age 55 and who decide when to retire in the remaining T years of their
lifetime. Each individual behaves according to a life-cycle labor supply model in which
preferences are de￿ned over consumption ct in each period t 2 f0;1;:::;Tg, and years of
work R beyond age 55. We assume that there is no uncertainty or time discounting and
that each individual lives for T periods. Especially individuals are not subject to the risk of
layo⁄s, job changes, or major health shocks.15 To concentrate on the e⁄ect of severance pay
on delays in retirement we further assume a quasi-linear utility function, which eliminates
income e⁄ects.16 In this setting without discounting or uncertainty, an individual will
consume a constant fraction of her total income in each period.
Following the sequential decision procedure outlined in the previous subsection, we
start with the model for counterfactual retirement choices. In the absence of any severance
15The assumption of no uncertainty is a useful approximation to describe the environment in which
retirement decisions of higher-tenured workers in Austria take place for multiple reasons. First, layo⁄s
are concentrated amongst lower-tenured, younger workers. Second, collective bargaining agreements de-
termine a signi￿cant portion of earnings based on age, experience, tenure and other observable employee
characteristics.
16To analyze the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we will experiment with more general
utility functions in section 5.3.














where y denotes the individual￿ s annual earnings, x denotes unearned income, and ￿ denotes
an individual￿ s taste for work. We assume that tastes for work are distributed across
individuals according to the distribution function F(￿) de￿ned on (0;￿max] and a higher
value of ￿ corresponds to higher taste for work as opposed to leisure. The parameter e
captures the convexity in the disutility of work; we discuss this parameter in more detail
below. Solving the optimization problem, counterfactual retirement choices are given by
R(￿) = ￿(￿y)
e (2)
where ￿ = 1 is the marginal utility of income. We highlight that these counterfactual
retirement choices capture retirement decisions when ignoring the severance payments but
still taking all other ￿nancial incentives for retirement into account.
After selecting a counterfactual retirement date while ignoring the severance payments,
individuals follow the second step of the decision process and select an optimal retirement
date while taking the ￿nancial incentives from the severance payments into account. We
assume that each individual has a threshold retirement age, ￿ R ￿ R(￿), such that, when
retiring after the threshold age, the individual will have accumulated su¢ cient years of
tenure to qualify for a lump-sum payment dx. Since individuals di⁄er in their years of
tenure at age 55, the threshold retirement ages are heterogeneously distributed across
individuals. Formally, each individual solves the following optimization problem to select
his optimal retirement date when taking his severance payment into account,
max
R>R(￿)










Optimal retirement choices for individuals with counterfactual retirement choice R(￿) =
R and di⁄erent values of the severance payment threshold at ￿ R are illustrated in Figure 11.
As shown, the severance payments create discontinuous increases in individuals￿budget sets
at the threshold retirement ages. For some individuals, the thresholds are su¢ ciently early
such that these individuals would prefer to retire at the tenure thresholds with the severance
payments rather than retire at the counterfactual date without the severance payments.
16For other individuals, the thresholds are su¢ ciently late such that these individuals would
prefer to retire earlier, at the counterfactual date, without the severance payments rather
than retire later with the severance payments.
Because the threshold ages vary across individuals with constant taste for work ￿,
the amount of time between each individuals￿tenure threshold and her counterfactual
retirement age, denoted by dR = ￿ R ￿ R(￿), also varies across individuals. Intuitively, dR
captures the amount of delay from one￿ s counterfactual retirement age that is necessary to
qualify for the severance pay. An individual￿ s optimal labor supply strategy incorporating
the severance payment threshold is therefore to set a critical value ￿(￿) that captures
the maximum amount of time he is willing to delay retirement from the counterfactual
retirement age to qualify for his severance payment. If dR ￿ ￿(￿), then the individual will
delay retirement and retire at his threshold age ￿ R; otherwise the individual will retire at
his counterfactual retirement age R(￿). The critical value ￿(￿) is determined by solving
for the length of time that makes the individual indi⁄erent between retiring early without
the severance payment and retiring at the tenure threshold with the severance payment.
Formally, the critical value is characterized by solving the following indi⁄erence equation
for ￿(￿),









utility when retiring early without sev pay









utility when retiring at threshold with sev pay
: (4)
As indicated by the notation, the critical value or maximum length of time an individual
is willing to delay retirement to qualify for severance pay varies with the taste for work ￿.
Speci￿cally, ￿(￿) is longer for individuals with a higher value of ￿. All individuals of type
￿ = ￿max are willing to delay retirement up to the maximum length of delay ￿(￿max). But
for individuals with smaller values of ￿ < ￿max the willingness to delay retirement is lower.
In the aggregate, the model implies that the frequency of retirements by tenure follow a
declining pattern before the tenure threshold. The number of retirements relative to the
counterfactual retirement date drops when the highest types ￿max start delaying retirement
and as we move closer to the threshold lower types join which further lowers the observed
number of retirements relative to the counterfactual.17
Figure 12 illustrates the declining pattern in the number of retirements prior to the sev-
17Whether the frequency or retirements goes all the way to zero prior the threshold, or whether there
are individuals retiring just before a tenure threshold, depends on the distribution of ￿.
17erance pay threshold obtained from a simulation of the model.18 The simulated model also
takes into account that there are excess retirements just after the government-mandated
tenure thresholds in addition to excess retirements exactly at the government-mandated
tenure thresholds in Figure 10. To capture this observed pattern, we assume that some
employers impose tenure thresholds beyond the government-mandated tenure thresholds
for some employees. Intuitively, some employers require some employees to complete spe-
ci￿c tasks or projects prior to paying these employees their severance payments. Using ￿ r
to denote the retirement age corresponding to the government-mandated tenure threshold,
we assume that an individual￿ s threshold retirement age is given by
￿ R = ￿ r + z
where z represents the amount of additional time required for project completion. We
assume that z is distributed on [0;1) according to density p(z).
4.3 The Intertemporal Labor Supply Elasticity
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in labor supply is de￿ned to capture how
labor supply responds to anticipated variation in earnings per unit of time (i.e., anticipated
wage variation). Intuitively, when a wage increase is anticipated, it is already factored into
lifetime income so that the marginal utility of lifetime income can be assumed to be held
constant. Thus, using ￿ to denote the marginal utility of lifetime income (the multiplier
on the individual￿ s budget constraint), the intertemporal labor supply elasticity is de￿ned
by dlnR
dlny j￿. Solving the individual￿ s optimization problem, the intertemporal labor supply




Intuitively, when the marginal disutility from additional labor supply rises very rapidly,
an individual will not adjust his labor supply very much in response to an anticipated
wage increase. In the life-cycle labor supply model above, we speci￿cally refer to e as
an intertemporal (￿-constant) elasticity because this parameter governs responsiveness to
severance payments that can be fully anticipated and hence factored into the marginal
utility of income. The intertemporal labor supply elasticity is re￿ ected in the curvature
18The parameter values and distributions used in the simulation are described in the Sensitivity Analysis
section.
18of an individual￿ s indi⁄erence curves, or equivalently in the critical value ￿ that captures
an individual￿ s willingness to delay retirement for a severance payment. In particular, a
larger elasticity corresponds to a willingness to delay retirement for a longer amount of
time, which increases the critical value.
4.4 Intensive & Extensive Margin Elasticities
While we have de￿ned the above intertemporal labor supply elasticity in terms of career
length, this extensive margin elasticity di⁄ers from the more traditional intensive margin
intertemporal labor supply elasticity which is usually de￿ned in terms of hours of work.
To highlight the distinction between these elasticities, we relate the model above to a
more traditional life-cycle labor supply model. Speci￿cally, in the setting above with no
discounting and no uncertainty, a more traditional life cycle labor supply model could de￿ne










where wt captures the hourly wage at time t, ￿(t) captures how the disutility of work evolves
with time (age), and v(:) captures the disutility over hours of work. In this problem, the
individual chooses a pro￿le of hours of work at each point in time fhtg. The intensive






To make the relationship with the career-length model above more explicit, suppose
that an individual is restricted such that he can choose to either work ￿ h hours or none at
all, i.e. ht 2 f0;￿ hg for all t and v(0) = 0 < v(￿ h). In this case, if ￿(t) is monotonically
increasing (i.e. ￿(t0) > ￿(t) for t0 > t), then an individual￿ s optimization problem would
simplify to choosing an optimal retirement date R; in particular, using h￿(t) to denote an
individual￿ s optimal pro￿le of hours of work, the optimal retirement date would be de￿ned
by
R 2 [0;T] s.t. h
￿(t) =
(
h for t ￿ R
0 for t > R
:
Intuitively, if an individual can only work a ￿xed number of hours in every period and
working is becoming more di¢ cult over time, the individual￿ s optimal strategy is to simply
19pick a time at which he will stop working. Furthermore, after re-normalizing such that
~ ￿(t) = ￿(t)v(￿ h) and yt = wt￿ h, the individual￿ s optimization problem can be re-formulated
























highlights that the extensive margin, or career length,
intertemporal elasticity e re￿ ects how quickly the marginal disutility of work increases with
age. In other words, while eintensive is determined by the curvature of v(:), the extensive
margin elasticity e depends on ￿(t). This implies that the extensive margin elasticity can
be completely independent of the intensive margin elasticity. While both intensive and
extensive margin elasticities are important to estimate, we focus only on estimating the
extensive margin elasticity since we lack data on hours of work and since the severance
payment incentives apply only to career length decisions.
An alternative, but closely related, view of the distinction between labor supply elastici-
ties at the extensive and intensive margins is the focus of recent work in the macroeconomics
literature. In particular, Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) develop a life-cycle model of labor
supply in which both intensive margin and extensive margin labor supply decisions arise
due to of ￿xed costs of labor force participation. The intensive margin decision corresponds
to the choice of how many hours to work in a given period while the extensive margin de-
cision corresponds to the choice of which, or how many, periods to work. Using this model
in a general equilibrium setup, Rogerson and Wallenius examine how aggregate (lifetime)
hours of work respond to taxes. They emphasize that, even when the intensive margin
elasticity is small, the aggregate responses may be large because the extensive margin elas-
ticity can be large. Moreover, they show that there is an important interaction between
the intensive and extensive margins: less adjustment on the extensive margin necessarily
implies more adjustment at the intensive margin. Intuitively, the less an individual likes to
change hours over the life cycle, the higher is the ￿xed cost required to induce a retirement
and thus the larger the response at the extensive margin.
In our empirical analysis and in the model above, we are able to focus explicitly on the
extensive (career length) margin highlighted by Rogerson and Wallenius. Importantly, the
intertemporal labor supply elasticity in our model, i.e. the structural parameter e, exactly
captures the extensive margin elasticity that Rogerson and Wallenius emphasize. The
20identi￿cation of this parameter comes from variation in the nonlinearities in budget sets
due to severance payments, which corresponds to variation in the ￿xed costs of participation
in the Rogerson and Wallenius framework.
Additionally, similar to Rogerson and Wallenius, this extensive margin elasticity cap-
tures the elasticity of aggregate (lifetime) hours of work when the intensive margin elasticity
is small. To demonstrate this, we note that with a small intensive margin elasticity, an indi-
vidual must essentially work some set number of hours ￿ h in each period that he works, but
he can choose the number of periods that he works, R. In this case, the elasticity of aggre-







The estimation the intertemporal labor supply elasticity is based on the counterfactual
labor supply equation and the indi⁄erence condition that determines the critical value ￿,
equations (2) and (4) respectively, which we repeat here for clarity:
￿ R ￿ ￿ = ￿(￿y)
e

















Our estimation strategy is to solve the two equations for ￿ and e using estimated infor-
mation on y, ￿ R, dx and ￿ from the data. The crucial moment we derive from the data
to make this procedure work is the length of delay ￿ that makes the individual indi⁄er-
ent between retiring at the counterfactual retirement date and delaying retirement to the
tenure threshold. Essentially, this moment is estimated from the observed distribution of
retirements by tenure (see Figure 10, presented in the previous section).
Our model assumes that individuals are heterogeneous in their taste for work ￿ and
that types are randomly distributed in the population. As we have discussed, each type
has a di⁄erent indi⁄erence condition and consequently there is variation in ￿(￿). The
identi￿cation of e requires, however, that we pin down a speci￿c type. Our strategy is to
focus on the type of individuals with the highest taste for work ￿max. For those individuals
the maximum length of delay can be identi￿ed from the observed retirement patterns
in Figure 10 as the point where number of retirements starts declining, relative to the
21counterfactual frequencies, prior to the tenure threshold. As the individuals with the
highest taste for work are willing to delay retirement the longest (i.e. they have the highest
value of ￿), we observe them relocating their retirement earliest and can thus identify
the responses of the type with highest value of ￿ = ￿max. Note that the assumption that
there is a ￿xed type with maximum taste for work ￿max in the population is crucial for
identi￿cation of the intertemporal labor supply elasticity. To examine the sensitivity of the
elasticity estimate e with respect to the point of indi⁄erence we will hold the type ￿max
￿xed and vary ￿.
In the next subsection we describe in detail the steps taken to estimate ￿ and introduce
the calibrated values for the other parameters. Subsequently we present estimation results
and sensitivity analysis.
5.2 Estimation Procedures
The steps of the procedure to estimate ￿ are illustrated in Figures 13 through 15 and
summarized as follows:
1. Estimate the spike in retirements and a continuous approximation of the observed
frequencies (Figure 13).
2. Estimate the counterfactual retirement frequencies using an interpolation of actual
frequencies away from the threshold (Figure 14).
3. Estimate the excess mass of retirements after the tenure threshold based on the
cumulative di⁄erences between the actual and counterfactual retirement frequencies
(Figure 15).
4. Estimate ￿ by equating the pre-threshold delayed retirements with the post-threshold
excess retirements (Figure 15).
To estimate the critical value ￿, we start by estimating a continuous approximation
of the observed retirement frequencies so that we can accurately characterize the amount
of excess mass at the tenure thresholds. Speci￿cally, in each interval between two tenure
thresholds, we regress the observed frequencies on a continuous 4th order polynomial in
tenure at retirement. We then predict the ￿tted values and set the values at the tenure
thresholds equal to the observed values. We re-scale the predicted values so that the total
number of individual retirements based on the ￿tted values is equal to the number of
22observed retirements. We refer to the frequencies based on this continuous approximation
as the actual frequencies. Figure 13 plots the observed frequencies against the actual
frequencies when pooling across all of the tenure thresholds.
In the second step, we estimate counterfactual frequencies of tenure at retirement that
would occur in the absence of the severance payments. For that purpose, we regress the
actual frequencies in each interval between two thresholds on a continuous 4th order poly-
nomial in tenure at retirement and a set of threshold dummies which are equal to 1 if the
level of tenure is within 1 year before, at or within 1 year after a tenure threshold.19 We
then set the threshold dummies equal to 0 and obtain the ￿tted values. Again, we re-scale
the ￿tted values so that the total number of actual retirements is equal to the total number
of counterfactual retirements. The identifying assumption implied by using dummies to
capture retirement behavior around the tenure thresholds is the following: in the absence
of the severance payment incentives, individuals with tenure around the thresholds would
behave similarly to individuals away from the tenure thresholds. Thus, the counterfactual
frequencies are identi￿ed based on individuals away from the tenure thresholds. Figure 14
plots the actual frequencies against the counterfactual frequencies when pooling across all of
the tenure thresholds. The plot highlights that, in the absence of the severance payments,
the counterfactual frequencies would be smooth through the tenure thresholds. While the
￿rst two steps treat each tenure threshold separately, the remaining steps in estimating
the point of indi⁄erence are based on the frequencies when pooling across all of the tenure
thresholds.
In the third step, we estimate the number of excess retirements at the tenure thresholds
based on the cumulative di⁄erences between the actual and counterfactual frequencies at
and just after the tenure thresholds. We select a post-threshold cuto⁄, RH, to capture all
of the excess retirements because the graphical evidence indicates that some of the excess
retirements come from individuals who retiring just after the tenure thresholds rather than
exactly on the thresholds. We use an iterative procedure to select RH. We choose an initial
RH just above ￿ R and compute the excess retirements based on the sum of the di⁄erences
between the actual and counterfactual frequencies at ￿ R through RH. Next, we increase RH
and compute the number of additional excess retirements that are added to the previous
measure of excess retirements. We continue to increase RH until the number of additional
excess retirements that is added to the previous measure of excess retirements is su¢ ciently
19The results are robust to increasing the window around the tenure thresholds to more than 1 year
before and after the thresholds and also to using higher order polynomials.
23small (i.e., less 3% of the measured excess mass). The determination of RH and the excess
retirements are illustrated in Figure 15.
In the ￿nal step, the critical value ￿ is estimated based on equating the number of
individuals delaying their retirements with the number of excess retirements. Analogous to
the estimation of the number of excess retirements, we estimate the number of individuals
delaying their retirements using the sum of the di⁄erences between the actual and coun-
terfactual frequencies just prior to the tenure threshold. In particular, ￿ is determined by
the pre-threshold value such that the number of individuals delaying their retirements is
equal to the number of excess retirements. Intuitively, the point of indi⁄erence is therefore
estimated as the maximum possible length of delay amongst individuals who delayed their
retirements to qualify for a (larger) severance payment. This strategy for determining ￿ is
illustrated in Figure 15.20
Standard errors for the estimated value of ￿ are generated by a bootstrap procedure
that repeats the above steps 1 ￿ 4 over 100 random samples of the data. We subsequently
transform these standard errors into standard errors for the estimate of the elasticity e.
For the remaining parameters in equations (2) and (4) we use the following calibrated
values. For annual earnings we use the mean annual earnings in the sample y = 20;000.
The amount of severance pay is given by the severance pay rule with dx = y=3. To select
a plausible value for the tenure threshold we note that we model the retirement decision
for an individual with the highest taste for work, who should consequently choose a late
retirement age. In Austria almost all retirements occur within 10 years from age 55 (see
Figure 2), so we select ￿ R = 10.
5.3 Estimation Results
Elasticity Estimate
Table 3 presents the estimation results. We estimate ^ RH = 0:75 indicating that the
excess retirements occur within roughly 9 months after the tenure thresholds. We estimate
that the total number of excess retirements to be roughly 5;200 individuals. To put this
20We note that ￿ is measured as the distance to the threshold ￿ R when there is no task completion (z = 0).
This is because otherwise we would expect to see delays in retirements further before the threshold at ￿+z
with z > 0 since task completions and tastes for work are independently distributed in the population.
For example, suppose that we observe delays beginning at 1:25 years prior to ￿ R and a maximum task
completion of z = 9 months. It would be incorrect to conclude that individuals are willing to delay their
retirements by 1:25 + 0:75 = 2:00 years; if this were the case, we would observe delays beginning at 2:00
years prior to the threshold ￿ R.
24￿gure in perspective, we also report the excess fraction which computes the excess retire-
ments as a fraction of the total number of counterfactual retirements between ￿ R and ^ RH.
We estimate the excess fraction to be roughly 0:40; this indicates that the number of excess
retirements is less than half of the total number of individuals that one would expect to
retire just after the tenure thresholds in the absence of the severance payments.
Next, we estimate the point of indi⁄erence to be ^ ￿ = 1:25; which indicates that the
maximum length of delay amongst individuals retiring just after the tenure thresholds is
roughly 1 year and 3 months. Additionally, we report the number of delayed retirements
based on the pre-threshold di⁄erences and check to make sure that the di⁄erence between
the estimated number of delayed retirements and the estimated number of excess retire-
ments is close to 0. Finally, based on the estimated point of indi⁄erence, we estimate the
intertemporal labor supply elasticity to be ^ e = 0:30: The standard error for this estimate
is roughly 0:05 indicating that the elasticity is estimated with relatively high statistical
precision. Indeed, with this relatively small standard error, elasticities greater than one are
easily outside of the 95% con￿dence interval of the estimated elasticity. Overall, the low
elasticity re￿ ects that the disutility of work rises relatively quickly with additional years of
work.
Sensitivity Analysis
While the estimation results highlight a relatively low elasticity, we now examine the
sensitivity of this result to alternative assumptions to gauge the plausibility of higher
labor supply elasticities given the available empirical evidence. First, since the point of
indi⁄erence ￿ plays an important role, and since the quasi-linear utility assumption implies
a relatively high valuation of the severance payments, we examine the implied elasticities
at alternative points of indi⁄erence and under di⁄erent utility speci￿cations in Figure 16.
In particular, the elasticities in this ￿gure are computed using the following indi⁄erence
condition,
Tu(





















where we take advantage of the result that, with no uncertainty and no time discounting,
an individual will consume a constant fraction of his total income in each period. We
consider constant relative risk aversion utility functions u(c) = c1￿g
1￿g with g ￿ 0, which nest
25the baseline quasi-linear utility function used in the estimation at g = 0.21 The following




dx = 0:333 ￿ y
￿ R = 10:
The value for annual earnings y is chosen to roughly correspond to the mean annual earn-
ings reported in the summary statistics in Table 2. The value for unearned income x is
chosen so that the individual consumes 15;000 euros in each period, consistent with a 75%
replacement rate from government-provided pension bene￿ts.
Figure 16 plots the elasticity e on the vertical axis against the point of indi⁄erence ￿
on the horizontal axis given di⁄erent values of g. We focus ￿rst on the black solid line
which captures the relationship between e and ￿ given the baseline utility speci￿cation at
g = 0. The plot highlights that the elasticity increases as the maximum amount of time
that individuals are willing to delay their retirements for the severance payments increases.
Intuitively, if individuals are willing to delay their retirements by a longer time, this would
imply that they are more responsive to the anticipated bene￿ts. The ￿gure illustrates that,
under the baseline utility function, estimating an elasticity greater than 1:0 would require
estimating a point of indi⁄erence more than 2 years prior to the threshold. Similarly, the
alternative utility functions would also require a larger point of indi⁄erence to estimate an
elasticity great than 1:0. A larger point of indi⁄erence is inconsistent with the estimated
excess mass and the graphical patterns observed in the data.
Continuing with Figure 16, we next consider the impacts of di⁄erent utility speci￿-
cations on the implied elasticities. The ￿gure highlights that as g increases, the implied
elasticities at each point of indi⁄erence also increase. The intuition for this result is as fol-
lows. As g increases, utility over consumption becomes more curved so that the marginal
utility of consumption decreases faster. A lower marginal utility of consumption implies
a lower valuation of the severance payment. Holding the point of indi⁄erence ￿xed while
increasing g therefore amounts to holding the change in labor supply ￿xed while reducing
21For g = 1, we use u(c) = log(c).
26the magnitude of the incentives causing the change in labor supply, and this implies a
higher labor supply elasticity. Importantly, increasing g has a larger e⁄ect on the elasticity
at higher values of ￿. Since the estimated point of indi⁄erence is relatively close to the
threshold, the implied elasticity is relatively una⁄ected by increasing g; with g = 2:0, the
implied elasticity is still less than 0:5.
To further estimate the examine the plausibility of higher intertemporal labor supply
elasticities, we simulate the theoretical model using di⁄erent elasticities and then compare
the simulated outcomes against the data. We simulate 76;400 individuals to match the
sample size of the restricted sample used in Figure 10. We simulate the model using quasi-
linear utility as in the estimation, so the parameters T and x become irrelevant and do
not need to be speci￿ed. Annual earnings and the severance payments are set as above
(y = 20;000 and dx = 0:333 ￿ y). Lastly, the distributional assumptions for ￿, ￿ R and
z are as follows. We assume that ￿ is drawn from an truncated exponential distribution
with parameter ￿ = 0:25; the truncation points are set so that counterfactual retirement
choices are between 0 and 10. To set the distribution of threshold retirement ages, we
￿rst draw a threshold distance from uniform distribution on [￿3;3] for each individual.
Next, we draw a task completion length z 2 f0;1;:::9g; the probabilities for each possible
z value are chosen to approximate the observed fraction of excess retirements at each
number of months beyond the tenure thresholds. We then add the threshold distance and
task completion length to the individual￿ s counterfactual retirement age to determine the
threshold retirement age.
Figure 17 presents a plot of the data and simulated outcomes using elasticities e = 0:30
and e = 1:0. The ￿gure highlights that a larger elasticity implies that the declines in the
frequencies of retirements by distance to the threshold start much earlier. In particular,
with an elasticity of e = 1:0, we would expect to start seeing declines at roughly 2 years
before the thresholds. Because the point of indi⁄erence is much further before the threshold,
the higher elasticity also predicts a much larger spike at the tenure threshold since more
individuals would prefer to delay their retirements. The lower elasticity implies a point of
indi⁄erence closer to the threshold and hence a smaller excess mass just after the threshold
as well. Thus, higher elasticities appear to be at odds with the observed patterns in the
data.
276 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence on individuals￿willingness to delay exiting the labor force
in response to anticipated increases in retirement bene￿ts. This evidence is based on dis-
continuous increases in retirement bene￿ts upon completion of 10, 15, 20, and 25 years of
tenure by retirement. The graphical evidence illustrates a relatively modest willingness to
delay retirement in response to the discontinuous increases in bene￿ts at the tenure thresh-
olds. Based on this evidence, we estimate a low intertemporal labor supply elasticity of
0:30. Because of the large sample size and minimal measurement error from the adminis-
trative data, there is high statistical precision in this estimate. Additionally, there is high
economic precision in the estimate since the estimation is based on relatively large changes
in ￿nancial incentives. Intuitively, large changes in ￿nancial incentives may be more likely
to permit identi￿cation of underlying structural parameters since individuals are less likely
to be overwhelmed by optimization frictions and adjustment costs.22
Based on the empirical evidence from the current analysis, we conclude that it is di¢ cult
to reconcile the di⁄erence between intertemporal labor supply elasticities in macroeconomic
and microeconomic models based only on the di⁄erence between the intensive and extensive
margins of labor supply. In particular, elasticities in macroeconomic models may be larger
than elasticities from microeconomic models due to other factors such as adjustment costs
or search frictions (see Chetty et al (2010) and Hall (2006) respectively).
22See Chetty (2009).
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Individuals in cohorts born 1930 - 1940 1,578,549
Still employed at age 55 651,336 -59%
More than one year employment experience before age 55 625,251 -4%
Excluding workers ever employed as civil servant 546,308 -13%
Excluding workers withlast job not in construction 487,019 -11%
Excluding left censored tenure in last job 380,737 -22%
Workers retiring withing 6 months of their last job 269,411 -29%
Restricted sample of highly responsive individuals
Excluding individuals with high number of sick leave days 233,976 -13%
Excluding individuals with high or low average earnings 197,726 -15%
Excluding workers from firms with less than 10 employees 159,186 -19%
Excluding workers with in jobs with highest rigidity index  154,484 -3%
Notes: Numbers based on the ASSD 
Table 1
Sample SelectionFull Sample Tenure at Retirement ≥ 10
# of Individuals 269,411 142,332






Annual Earnings 18459.69 19572.48
17983.05 19649.52
13458.51 13571.58
Fraction Top-Coded 0.14 0.15
- -
0.34 0.36
Years of Employment  32.71 34.08
34.54 35.28
9.59 8.36




Claiming Disability Pensions 0.282 0.233
Claiming Early Retirement Pensions 0.375 0.401
Claiming Old Age Pensions 0.343 0.366
Agriculture & Mining 0.045 0.041
Manufacturing 0.255 0.240




Notes: Except for the Fractions, the mean, median and standard deviations are reported 
for each variable. All earnings variables are expressed in 2008 euros. Summary statistics 
for lifetime earnings are based on birth cohorts beyond 1935. Employment Time and Sick 






5198.7270 5200.1261  -1.3991   0.3859
(106.7238) (112.8092) (35.4562) (0.0111)
Δ e
 1.2500   0.2995
(0.1015) (0.0491)
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Fig. 9. Retirement at Thresholds by Job Rigidity
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Fig. 11. Optimal Retirement Choices with Severance Pay
Rindifferent
Point of Indifference (Max Length of Delay) :
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Fig. 17.